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WEST VIRGINIA
LAW REVIEW
Volume 62 April, 1960 Number 3
THE JUDGE'S RESPONSIBILITY ON A PLEA OF GUILTY*
JUDGE WILLIAm J. THOMPSON**
O NE of the most serious responsibilities which rests on the shoul-
ders of a trial judge in a criminal case is that of accepting a
plea of guilty from an offender. Such pleas are received in approxi-
mately ninety per cent of all the cases he handles. In each instance
he is confronted with three constitutional guaranties which belong
to every defendant and which are found in both the federal and
state constitutions: (1) that he shall have the assistance of counsel;'
(2) that he shall be entitled to a trial by jury;2 and (3) that he shall
not be deprived of life or liberty without due process of law.3
From time to time the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
must devote considerable time to hearing writs complaining of
abuses by the trial court in connection with the handling of guilty
pleas. A few years ago some inmates of the penitentiary at Mounds-
viUle directed a petition to the members of the West Virginia Legis-
lature, in which it was charged that under the present practice in
this state of accepting pleas it was common "to extract pleas suitable
to the prosecution" through "bargaining, compromises, various types
of pressure, malice, and prejudice." The petition further complained
that numerous persons were presently confined in that institution
under pleas improperly received by the trial courts. These courts
were accused of use "every shabby trick" in order to "expedite and
clear their docket." According to the petitioners "this condition
* This article was originally delivered as the Annual Address of the
President of the West Virginia Judicial Association at Charleston, West Vir-
ginia, October 23, 1959.
* Judge, Intermediate Court of Kanawha County.
SU.S. CoNsT. amend. VI; W. VA. CoNsT. art. III, § 14.
2 Ibid.
3 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V, XIV § 1; W. VA. CONST. art III, § 10.
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certainly reflects upon the dignity of the courts." The matter re-
ceived state-wide publicity with the result that the Legislative
Interim Committee made some study of it.4 Those of us who exercise
trial court responsibility in criminal cases can curtail much very
unfavorable and often unfair and embarrassing accusation and criti-
cism of the judiciary by following appropriate procedure and using
precaution attendant upon accepting such pleas.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has said that
"before receiving a plea of guilty in a criminal case, the court shall
see that it is made by a person of competent intelligence, freely and
voluntarily, and with a full understanding of its nature and effect,
and of the facts on which it is founded."5 And later in State v. Stone,
the court wrote: "To authorize the acceptance and entry of a plea
of guilty and judgment and sentence thereon, the plea must be
entirely voluntary. It must not be induced by fear, by misrepre-
sentation, by persuasion, or by the holding out of false hopes, nor
be made through inadvertence, or by ignorance."6 A plea of guilty
entered other than voluntarily by the defendant has consistently been
held incapable of supporting a sentence imposed thereon for the
obvious reason that it deprives the defendant of a trial by jury and
violates his rights guaranteed under the due process clause of the
Federal Constitution.7 A defendant cannot, however, plead guilty
with the expectancy of receiving a shorter sentence and then have
his sentence set aside if he knew his rights and the consequences
of his act at the time he entered the plea, providing he was not
induced to do so by someone such as his counsel, the law enforce-
ment officers or the prosecuting attorney.
The criterion, it would seem, leaves no room for compromised
pleas or agreements entered into between the prosecuting attorney
and the defendant or even his counsel, although there might be
acquiescence therein by the trial judge. Pleas received with the
4 The petition was presented to the 1957 session of the legislature as was
styled, "Petition Urging the Abolishment of the State Habitual Criminal Law
on the Basis of the Evidence Presented." The matter was referred to the
Legislative Interim Committee with the result that some study was made of
the problem under the direction of Dr. Carl Frazier and Professor Londo H.
Brown of the West Virginia University. See, Brown, West Virginia Habitual
Criminal Law, 59 W. VA. L. REv. 30 (1956) and Brown, West Virginia Inder-
terminate Sentence and Parole Laws, 59 W. VA. L. REv. 142 (1957).
5Nicely v. Butcher, 81 W. Va. 247, 94 S.E. 147 (1917) (Syl. 8).
6101 W. Va. 53, 56, 131 S.E. 872, 873 (1926) quoting 16 C.J. Criminal
Law § 747.
7 United States v. Swaggerty, 349 U.S. 959 (1952).
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understanding that the state will not ifie an information for prior
convictions are not proper under these pronouncements of the court.
In light of modem decisions the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals no doubt would have little patience with the argument that
such pleas are justified because they were taken in the economy
of time, the hurry of business, or to save the state the costly expense
of a jury trial. Several courts have held that the law favors a trial
on the merits in criminal matters.
Manifestly the trial court receives more protection and the de-
fendant is less likely to be denied his constitutional right of a jury
trial, or deprived of his life or liberty without due process of law
when the defendant is ably represented by counsel at all stages of
the case. A notion prevails among many members of the bar that
one of the first things an inexperienced lawyer just out of law
school should do is get the court to appoint him to represent indi-
gent defendants in criminal cases where a person's liberty is at stake.
The basis for such reasoning seems to be that these prisoners cannot
afford, and therefore cannot expect, better legal assistance. This is
not only an unsound concept but the practice, so often followed
in our state courts, is plagued with many pitfalls for the judge as
well as the defendant.
Under the common law the accused was not entitled to the
assistance of counsel.8 Originally in England counsel was not per-
mitted to be heard upon the general issue of not guilty of any indict-
ment for felony. It was the practice of the English judges, however,
to permit counsel to advise with the defendant as to the conduct of
his case and with respect to questions of law.9 In 1695 the rule was
relaxed by statute to the extent of permitting one accused of treason
the privilege of being heard by counsel.10 But the rule forbidding
counsel participating in felony cases continued until 1836.11 The
founders of our country and the framers of our state constitution
took a different view of the matter from the very beginning. The
Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution guarantees the right
of assistance of counsel to a defendant for his defense in a federal
court, and a similar protection is found in Section 14 of the Bill of
Rights for our state constitution. However, formerly no decision
8 4 BLAcrroNE, Co:xdvxnTAIms @355.
9Ibid.
10 Act of Settlement, 1695, 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3, § 1.
11 Prisoners' Counsel Act, 1836, 6 Will. 4, c. 114, § 1. See, 9 Homuswo=R,
HisroRY oF ENmaGSH LAw 235 (1926).
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held that there was a constitutional duty to appoint counsel for indi-
gent defendants, and the earlier cases do not discuss the question of
the court's duty to advise accused of his right to representation by
counsel.
In 1938 the Supreme Court of the United States initiated a
new trend in constitutional and criminal law in the celebrated case
of Johnson v. Zerbst.12 The court's opinion in that case radically
modified the guaranty of the right to counsel in federal prosecutions
as embodied in the Sixth Amendment. That provision of the Con-
stitution, according to the court, entitled one charged with crime
to assistance of counsel, compliance with which was a jurisdictional
prerequisite to a federal court's authority to deprive the accused
of his life and liberty. The court, in effect, held that it was not only
the trial court's duty to appoint competent counsel to assist accused
at certain stages of the prosecution upon his request, but the court
must advise him that he is entitled to assistance of counsel; and if
he is unable to obtain services of an attorney, the trial court will
appoint or designate a competent one to assist him. The decision
reiterated the principle that courts indulge in every reasonable
presumption against waiver of constitutional rights. In its opinion
the court said there is imposed upon the trial judge "the serious and
weighty responsibility . . . of determining whether there is an in-
telligent and competent waiver by the accused."' 3 If an accused
has no knowledge of his rights, a fortiori, he cannot intelligently
and competently waive them. This case involved a conviction upon
the plea of not guilty where defendant undertook his own defense.
The c:urt also stated it would be fitting and appropriate for the
determination of whether there was a waiver to appear upon the
record.
In Walker v. Johnston14 the United States Supreme Court
applied the Johnson v. Zerbst ruling to a situation where the de-
fendant indicated his desire to plead guilty. The petitioner, accord-
ing to the court, not having been advised by the trial judge that he
was entitled to have counsel appointed if he were unable to pay
an attorney, and not having been asked by the court whether he
desired counsel, and having been without advice of counsel which
he had not waived, and having pleaded guilty, was entitled to the
12:304 U.S. 458 (1938).
13Id. at 465.
14:312 U.S. 275 (1940).
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relief prayed for. Then followed Glasser v. United States15 in which
there was a possibility of inconsistent interest where a lawyer
represented two co-defendants and the court said: "The right to
have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to
allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of
prejudice arising from its denial."'16
While provisions similar to that found in the Federal Constitution
with respect to assistance of counsel are embodied in the consti-
tutions of several other states, state courts for the most part have
not given their own constitutional guaranty such a broad interpre-
tation as the United States Supreme Court has done. Our state
constitution is one of those that employs language almost identical
to that in the Sixth Amendment, and the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, in State v. Abdella,17 stated that the decisions
of the United States Supreme Court, which deal with a pertinent
clause of the United States Constitution, are entitled to the greatest
consideration where the West Virginia Constitution employs identi-
cal language.
State policy, either legislative or judicial, or both, denying or
limiting the duty to advise an accused of his right to counsel is,
however, restricted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and must be considered in light of that amendment,
which fundamentally guarantees the accused a fair trial. While in
this new trend, the United States Supreme Court does not hold
that the specific guaranties of the Sixth Amendment as applied to
federal prosecutions are incorporated as such in the Fourteenth
Amendment, and thus equally applicable to state procedures, there
have been a number of state convictions set aside by the United
States Supreme Court on the ground that the failure of the trial
court to advise an accused of his right to counsel.' 8 The absence
of counsel, combined with other factors, was held, in such instances
to contravene the requirements of due process within the purview
of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Foster v. Illinois'9 the Court
said its duty did not go beyond safeguarding "'rights essential to
15 815 U.S. 60 (1941).
16 Id. at 76.
17 189 W. Va. 428, 82 S.E.2d 918 (1954).
Is E.g. Moore v. Michigan, 855 U.S. 155 (1957); Herman v. Claudy,
850 U.S. 116 (1956); Massey v. Moore, 848 U.S. 105 (1954); Chandler v.
Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954); Palmer v. Aske, 842 U.S. 184 (1951).
19 882 U.S. 184 (1946).
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a fair hearing' by the States."20 However, in Foster v. Illinois, which
was a case involving an indeterminate sentence for burglary and
larceny, four of the nine members of the court, dissented and affirma-
tively stated that the Sixth Amendment guaranty of the right to
counsel in criminal cases is applicable to such proceedings in the
state courts. They accused the majority of "watering down" the Bill
of Rights guarantee. In the dissenting opinion they said that when-
ever men appear in court for trial or plea, on serious charges without
counsel, that in itself should keep the courts from closing their eyes
with respect to constitutional rights, unless they are so calloused of
the rights of men without any conception of fairness so as to tolerate
such action.
The right to effective assistance of counsel in a criminal pro-
ceeding, whether on a plea of guilty or not guilty, exists at every
stage of the proceedings including that of sentencing. It is said that
the attorney should be present on a sentencing date for the purpose
of presenting extenuating circumstances in the case, or explaining
defendant's conduct, to correct errors or report in the defendant's
past record, and in short, to appeal to the equity of the court.
In cases where the defendant has waived his right to counsel,
the responsibility resting on the judge in accepting a guilty plea is
even much greater. In performing this "serious and weighty re-
sponsibility" the trial judge, according to the United States Supreme
Court in Van Moltke v. Gilles "must investigate as long and thor-
oughly as the circumstances of the case before him demand... To
be valid such waiver must me made with an apprehension of the
nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them,
the range of allowable punishment thereunder, possible defenses to
the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof and all other
facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter."21 The
court said the examination must be a "penetrating and comprehen-
sive" one. This precaution must be exercised at every stage of the
proceeding and cannot be discharged as though it were a mere
procedural formality. The West Virginia Supreme Court in discuss-
ing circumstances under which a plea of guilty could be properly
received in State ex rel. Eplin,22 cited with approval portions of
the language used by Justice Frankfurter in Von Moltke v. Gilles,
supra.
20.1d. at 189.
21832 U.S. 708, 722, 724 (1947).
22 182 W. Va. 610, 53 S.E.2d 614 (1949).
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A situation sometimes arises in a criminal court where the
defendant announces he wants to waive his right to counsel and
plead guilty, but before he does so he desires to consult with the
prosecuting attorney. The state's attorney is in no position to repre-
set an accused and therefore, should not be called upon to advise
him. In Von Moltke v. Gilles, supra, the United States Supreme
Court said, "The constitution does not contemplate that prisoners
shall be dependent upon government agents for . . . aid."23 In
United States v. Lester the Second Circuit Court of Appeals said
"[This] requirement [that a plea of guilty be made voluntarily]
is not satisfied if the plea is entered by one who is not fully aware
of... the extent to which reliance may safely be placed upon any
representations which may have been made by the prosecutor... :'
Many of the earlier decisions, in determining whether relief
should be granted in cases where there was a guilty plea, turned
on the question of whether there was a miscarriage of justice or
whether the plea spoke the truth. But the present emphasis of the
courts is primarily one of whether there has been an intelligent
waiver of constitutional rights. Such waivers are frowned upon
unless, as the West Virginia Court said in State ex rel. Eplin, supra,
they were made with "observance of the precautions and solemnities
required by law." However, a guilty plea should always "speak the
truth," and the judge should determine this fact before he accepts
it. He can have no self-satisfaction if otherwise.
There is serious question whether a judge should accept a plea
to a lesser offense included in the indictment if in fact the lesser
included offense "does not speak the truth." Particularly: Is a plea
to a lesser offense not justified on the ground that the state has a
weak case against the defendant which might result in an acquittal?
On the other hand, a trial judge sometimes finds himself in a
dilemma because of the impossibility of the law to meet adequately
every factual situation. He may feel that to apply the law in its
common and ordinary meaning will cause an unduly harsh and an
unconscionable result. Therefore, he may, out of the kindness of
his heart, accept a plea which doesn't speak the truth for he feels
that the ends of justice require such a course. Since his actions are
not supported by the law it is doubtful that he could expect much
protection from an appellate court once he is attacked, berated, and
23 832 U.S. at 725.
24 247 F.2d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1957).
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degraded by some unscrupulous attorney or ungrateful prisoner
who wants his freedom at any cost.
Of course, we are cognizant of the fact that men under long
penitentiary sentences want out. With abundant opportunity for
reflection on how to get out, they will imagine and invent all sorts
of spurious charges concerning the denial of constitutional rights.
Conceivably these people can create serious problems in the
administration of criminal law. We, as state trial judges, can, by
following certain precedures and using certain precautions, have an
effective means of protecting ourselves from such false or unfounded
charges, and at the same time safeguard the constitutional rights
and interests of a defendant.
The first precaution involves the appointment of counsel. The
proper procedure which should be followed is well stated in Rule
44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which is as follows:
"If the defendant appears in court without counsel the court shall
advise him of his right to counsel, and assign counsel to represent
him at every stage of the proceeding, unless he elects to proceed
without counsel or is able to obtain counsel." In this respect if a
defendant waives his right to counsel he can only do so intelligently
if he knows what it is he is waiving this right to, such as a charge
of breaking and entering, which is a felony punishable by an in-
termediate sentence of one to ten years in the state penitentiary.
No doubt, many of our state trial courts follow the procedure set
forth in this rule.
Secondly, the judge should always very carefully confront the
defendant with the exact nature of the charge. In some instances
he can do this best by reading the indictment, but the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals said it was not required by law that it
be done in this manner.2 5 In many cases the indictment, which is
usually couched in technical language, is more understandable to
the defendant if the charge is explained to the defendant by the
judge in simple everyday language. Along with this the judge
should explain to the defendant the nature of the possible punish-
ment which the charge carries. This is advisable even though our
court held in Boggess v. Briers26 that a failure by the trial court to
inform the defendant of the possible punishment was not ground
for relief.
25 State v. Adams, 103 S.E.2d 777 (W. Va. 1958).
26 134 W. Va. 370, 59 S.E.2d 480 (1950).
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Thirdly, the trial court should make a searching inquiry into
the facts and circumstances of the case at the time the plea is taken.
The court wants sufficient information from the defendant himself
which will disclose the commission of the crime, and the defendant's
participation therein, and not just a conclusion. The judge is entitled
to this consideration. He is not required to take a plea of guilty
just because an accused wants to plead guilty in order "to get it
over with."
Then the judge should determine whether the defendant is
entering his plea of his own free will, that is, whether it is being
given completely voluntarily by him. Also, in connection with this
"searching inquiry" it should be ascertained by the court whether
any promise .has been made to the defendant with respect to pun-
ishment or probation in the case either by the defendant's lawyer,
if he has one, the prosecuting attorney, the judge, or anyone else.
The one way to avoid a misunderstanding between the defendant
and the court in this matter is for the judge to ascertain this from
the defendant himself. Then the judge should ask the defendant
whether he understands that by entering a plea of guilty he is
waiving his right to a trial by jury, and on the other hand, if he
pleads not guilty he will get a jury trial.
In some courts the questions involved in the "searching inquiry"
are propounded to the defendant by counsel where he has a lawyer.
Whether the task is performed by the attorney or the trial judge
it should all be done in open court. It is not necessary to put the
defendant under oath to answer these questions, and appellate
courts have so held, although in some jurisdictions he is sworn and
put in the witness box to answer.
The fourth safeguard is that of a record itself. Some courts
record only the evidence taken at a trial. In others the court re-
porter is required to take down all proceedings in any criminal case.
Where there is a waiver, all inquiries concerning such waiver made
by the court should be recorded. Likewise, the questions pro-
pounded by the judge or counsel to the defendant with respect to
facts and circumstances surrounding the crime, the questions bear-
ing on the voluntariness of the plea, those with respect to whether
any promises have been made, and any other questions concerning
waiver of constitutional rights such as the waiver of a jury trial and
whether the defendant understands the nature of the charge and
the seriousness of his action in pleading guilty should all be made a
9
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matter of record. The "penetrating and comprehensive examination
of all the circumstances under which the plea is tendered" and the
"exacting inquiry" which is demanded of a trial judge in certain
situations should be taken down by the court reporter in shorthand
notes and these notes filed with the papers in the case. Such records
are not readily impeached and constitute firm evidence long after
the recollections of all the parties involved in the case have dimmed.
While we might say that this procedure takes us somewhat
beyond our obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment and under
the West Virginia Constitution and state statutes and decisions of
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, yet no judge can take
pride in holding his procedure to the very minimum of fairness as
required by the law. After all, we are dealing primarily here with
constitutional guaranties, and the life and liberty of an individual
is involved.
10
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